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This paper will examine the interaction between offshore jurisdictions and Russia, with 
particular emphasis on the role played by the British Virgin Islands in structuring offshore 
transactions. This paper will look at popular narratives about offshore jurisdictions, 
including traditional arguments about round-tripping and corruption, before examining 
the legal rationale for the use of offshore structures in Russia. It will be argued that the use 
of offshore jurisdictions arose as a response to deficiencies in the Russian legal system, 
particularly in terms of Russian law as it relates to property rights, and the related problem 
of enforcing such rights. In contrast to these perceived deficiencies in the Russian legal 
framework, offshore jurisdictions provided a stable and modern legal environment, the 
use of which allowed Russian investors to gain access to Western common law principles 
of corporate governance, property rights and shareholder rights.




this article will examine the use of offshore jurisdictions in russia, with particular 
emphasis on the role played by the British Virgin Islands [hereinafter BVI]. the 
objective of this paper is to understand the reasons behind the popularity of offshore 
structures in russian commerce, and to shed some light on the legal rationale behind 
their use, by examining the interplay between russian and offshore legal systems.
this is an important area for study, given the significant role that offshore 
jurisdictions play in russian foreign direct investment [hereinafter FdI]. the 
prevalence of offshore structures in russian FdI is well reported, and it has been 
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observed that in 2012, 11 of the main 40 recipients of russian FdI were offshore 
jurisdictions which were seen as acting as a transit platform for the movement of 
capital to other destinations. of these offshore zones, three jurisdictions are the 
largest recipients of russian FdI, being the BVI, the Cayman Islands and Cyprus. 
these three jurisdictions have played host to increasing and significant volumes of 
russian financial flows, with the growth of outward FdI stocks in Cyprus growing 
from $206 million to nearly $4 billion in the period between 1998 and 2006, the BVI 
increasing from almost zero in 1990 to $123.5 billion in 2006 and the Cayman Islands 
increasing from almost zero to $40.4 billion in the same period.
given the popularity of offshore finance centres, and the significant FdI flows 
passing through such jurisdictions, the question then arises as to why offshore 
structures have been used in russia. unfortunately, this is an area in which there is 
a lack of significant academic analysis and the few studies that address the topic 
simply focus on questions of tax avoidance, round-tripping and corruption. the legal 
rationale, practical use and function of offshore structures are rarely considered. this 
is a significant deficiency in the existing literature on the topic as legal concerns have 
been a key consideration behind the use of offshore structures in russia.
this paper will therefore attempt to redress this deficiency and cast some 
meaningful light on the role of offshore jurisdictions in russia, by looking to the 
legal rationale for the use of offshore structures. It is only by looking at the actual use 
of offshore structures in practice, and the legal environment which gives rise to their 
use, that we can achieve an understanding of the purpose behind such structures. In 
order to understand the rationale behind the use of offshore structures, this paper 
will examine the ways in which the use of offshore jurisdictions arose as a response 
to certain deficiencies within the russian legal system and the difficulties faced by 
russian enterprises in accessing international finance. this paper will argue that 
offshore jurisdictions, such as the BVI, have been used as a platform to overcome 
legal inefficiencies in the russian legal system and to manage legal risks in the face 
of an uncertain political and economic environment.
the rest of this paper is divided into three further sections which consider: 
(i) common narratives and popular misconceptions about the role of offshore 
jurisdictions in russia; (ii) the historical and legal context to property rights in russia; 
and (iii) the legal rationale for the use of offshore jurisdictions.
2. Common Narratives  
about the Role of Offshore Companies in Russia
Before looking at the legal rationale behind the use of offshore jurisdictions 
in russia, it will be useful to examine the existing literature in this area in order 
to understand the popular narratives and misconceptions which frame analysis 
on this topic. this is important given that most studies in this field assume that 
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offshore structures are either used for the round-tripping of funds or for laundering 
the proceeds of corruption. It is notable that the studies in this area do not address 
the legal rationale for the use of offshore structures. As a result, the exclusion of 
legal issues from this discourse creates an imbalanced and incomplete picture of 
this topic. therefore, before looking at the legal context, any discussion of this topic 
must first consider and address these popular narratives.
2.1. Round-Tripping Claims
the most common argument made about offshore jurisdictions is that they are 
used to facilitate the round-tripping of funds. round-tripping is essentially a process 
whereby funds are moved overseas and then re-routed into russia through the use of 
offshore vehicles, which thereby mask the original source of the funds. the traditional 
rationale given for round-tripping is that, by disguising russian sourced capital as 
‘foreign’ through the use of an offshore company, the russian investor will have 
access to tax or regulatory benefits that are usually reserved for foreign investors.
the round-tripping thesis is commonly held by observers of russian FdI patterns, 
although the assumptions underlying this theory are often undeveloped. For 
instance, one study states that ‘according to data from the Bank of russia, Bermuda, 
the British Virgin Islands and Cyprus were the three largest sources of FdI in russia 
as of 2010. this reflects the importance of round-tripping russian investments via 
tax-haven destinations.’ however, no source is provided for the claim that offshore 
FdI statistics reflect the importance of round-tripping, nor is this point elaborated 
further. It is simply accepted as fact. this is unfortunately a common problem in 
this area of study, as many observers adopt the same approach and take the round-
tripping argument as orthodoxy, without support or considered analysis.
A further problem with this approach is that the round-tripping thesis may not be 
an appropriate tool with which to understand russian FdI patterns. For example, the 
round-tripping argument is generally founded on studies concerning the People’s 
republic of China [hereinafter PrC] where it is commonly argued that PrC investors 
route funds through offshore companies in order to gain foreign investment benefits. 
however, russia has not given preferential tax and regulatory treatment to foreign 
investors in the same way as the PrC, so some caution is required in relying upon 
such theories when considering the russian investment environment. this concern 
has been expressed by some observers, with one paper noting that, in contrast to 
the investment environment in the PrC,
[russian] state policy towards inward FdI has been less supportive or even 
restrictive. Moreover, in many russian regions the regional authorities have 
erected barriers to foreign investors to protect incumbent firms from outside 
competition than provided incentives for foreign investors. hence the financial 
incentives granted to foreign investors are hardly a key explanatory factor for 
round-tripping behaviour.
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Not only is it unsuitable to apply concepts of round-tripping as they relate to 
the PrC to the russian experience, but it may also be inappropriate to overstate this 
concept at all. For instance, the theory rests upon the assumption that the money 
being routed through offshore centres is russian money being repatriated through 
offshore channels. however, this fails to account for the fact that other jurisdictions 
use the BVI to structure their financial transactions as well as to effect investment 
into russia. For instance, a report by the Carnegie Moscow Centre noted that ‘Chinese 
companies often invest abroad through the British Virgin Islands. the investment 
from the British Virgin Islands is quite substantial in the post soviet space including 
russia. It can be assumed that part of these investments in fact come from China.’
Additionally, it should be noted that other studies have examined the use of 
offshore jurisdictions (particularly in the Chinese context) and observed that round-
tripping is not a significant or sole explanation for the use of offshore structures 
in FdI patterns. Instead, it has been observed that ‘[t]ax minimisation through the 
Caribbean offshore thus seems to be less a motivating factor than property rights, 
investment seeking and institutional arbitrage.’  these other factors are important to 
bear in mind because offshore jurisdictions perform other roles than tax structuring. 
As Vlcek notes, ‘[t]he common portrayal of the [offshore jurisdiction] today as a 
tropical island “tax haven” fails to acknowledge that it provides other forms of 
regulatory arbitrage beyond taxation. It may be the home to mutual (hedge) funds, 
captive insurance and re-insurance firms, trust companies, and shipping registries, 
as well as an international business company (IBC) registry.’ As a result, consideration 
needs to be given to other factors rather than relying upon undeveloped notions of 
round-tripping. It will be seen later in this paper that these same motivating factors 
of property rights, investment seeking and institutional arbitrage, apply equally in 
the russian context.
2.2. Corruption Claims
Aside from the round-tripping argument, another common assumption that 
underlines many studies is that offshore structures are used in russia for the purposes 
of laundering the proceeds of corruption.
A number of papers approach this topic through the lens of criminality and 
assume, as their starting point, that offshore companies are used by russian investors 
for corrupt purposes. A good example of this perspective can be seen in a paper by 
Ledyaeva, karhunen, kosonen and whalley, who assert that the drivers for the use 
of offshore jurisdictions in russian capital outflows ‘mainly include tax avoidance / 
evasion, laundering the proceeds of corruption and securing the secrecy of an 
investor’s identity from russia’s corrupt and autocratic authorities.’  these are strong 
charges, and the crucial point to note is that, after making sweeping claims as to the 
nature of offshore transactions, no source or authority is provided for such assertions. 
Instead, these claims are posited as an assumed starting point for analysis, on which 
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the research is based, rather than a conclusion reached through neutral research and, 
consequently, no attempts are made to analyse and test these assumptions.
similarly, Ledyaeva, karhune, kosonen and whalley assert that given ‘the 
persistently high-level of corruption in russia, it is reasonable to suggest that corrupt 
public officials in russia utilize round-trip schemes via offshore centres for laundering 
the proceeds of corruption.’ Again, no specific source, authority or foundation is 
provided for such claims. this approach is therefore troubling, as it operates to 
ascribe a character of criminality to offshore jurisdictions by association rather than 
through fact, and is based upon supposition rather than analysis. without hard facts, 
it is not ‘reasonable to suggest’ that offshore structures are used for the purposes 
of laundering the proceeds of corruption. suggestion is not a sufficient ground on 
which to conduct analysis or perpetuate myths.
If serious claims are going to be made about the nature and role of offshore 
jurisdictions, they need to be supported by fact and reasoned analysis. the question 
then arises as to how, if these types of assertions are accepted, we can test and verify 
such claims.
one answer is to look to the courts as a source of fact. If offshore structures 
are used, as some authors suggest, for the purpose of laundering the proceeds 
of corruption, then these structures, and any claims or evidence of impropriety 
in respect of such structures, will ultimately come before the courts. As a result, 
the courts would also provide a key source of factual evidence to support such 
assertions. If these assertions are correct, then one would expect to see a significant 
number of court judgments concerning allegations of corruption and criminality.
In order to test these theories, research was conducted on all the judgments 
available at the Eastern Caribbean supreme Court, where such judgments were 
made by the BVI courts and either concerned russian parties or related russian 
business or assets. the BVI was used as a sample jurisdiction given that it is the 
leading offshore jurisdiction within russia in terms of FdI flows. In addition, the BVI 
has a robust legal system and a dedicated commercial court, ensuring that there 
would be a wide and easily available selection of judgments to review.
this research found that there were 41 relevant judgments concerning russian 
parties or enterprises located in russia. of these judgments, there were 7 cases in 
which fraudulent, dishonest or unlawful conduct was alleged, amounting to 17% 
of all judgments. of these 7 cases, there were no judgments in which fraudulent, 
dishonest or unlawful conduct was proven to the satisfaction of the court. what this 
research clearly shows is that corruption is not a significant issue before the courts 
in terms of the use of offshore structures in russia, given that only 17% of cases 
alleged such issues and that in no case was any allegation of fraudulent, dishonest 
or unlawful conduct proven. Based on this review of BVI cases, there is simply no 
grounding in proven fact or law to justify the corruption allegations raised by some 
academics and journalists.
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the question then arises as to why some authors persist in ascribing notions of 
criminality to offshore structures in russia, when there is clearly a lack of analysis 
underlying such assumptions and an absence of factual grounds to support these 
assertions. It would tend to suggest that some of the existing studies and journalistic 
reporting on this topic are unsound. It would also suggest that many studies may 
be tinctured by an inherent bias on the part of the observer.
the question of bias is important, as the fact that these claims are made on the 
basis of assertion rather than supported fact suggests that common perceptions 
on the use of offshore structures in russia is informed by value judgments. In a 
sense, it can be seen that many observers of russian business operate with innate 
or unconscious anti-russian bias, where it is assumed (rather than established) that 
russian commercial practices must necessarily involve corruption. this bias therefore 
infects popular perceptions towards the use of offshore structures in russia as, given 
the lack of understanding of the legal and commercial rationale behind the use of 
such structures, an assumption is made that their use must simply be a product of 
nefarious intent.
It can be seen that this anti-russian bias has a long history and arises frequently 
where russian business practices are involved. to take one example, this bias could be 
seen in relation to the failed bid by the russian company Severstal for Arcelor where 
The Wall Street Journal reported that there was a ‘mounting frustration in Moscow at 
a perceived anti-russian bias in European business’ and The New York Times similarly 
reported that ‘many western investors still look at russia in “comic book terms, as 
mysterious and mafia-run”.’ given the narratives concerning the use of offshore 
jurisdictions in russian FdI, it would appear that this comic book characterisation 
also extends into journalism and academic analysis. this frustration is shared by some 
contemporary observers of russian FdI. For instance, one paper notes that there were 
problems with creating ‘a positive and attractive image of russian business abroad 
[due to] the extendedly created politicised typologies of russian multinationals’ and 
another paper observed that russian investors face ‘a strong degree of suspicion in 
most parts of Eastern Europe and in the developed world . . . [even though] russian 
investors have frequently transformed bankrupt enterprises into thriving companies 
and are regarded as effective owners and employers.’
Aside from questions of bias, many studies also exhibit a lack of understanding 
as to the nature of offshore transactions. For example, many studies fail to address 
the legal rationale for the use of offshore jurisdictions, despite the fact that offshore 
structures are created in a legal context (given that offshore companies are creatures 
of law, created for legal purposes and governed by legal rules). this is an important 
consideration and, again, an examination of the BVI court judgments gives insight 
as to the real concerns surrounding offshore structures. An analysis of the court 
judgments relating to russia reveals that, rather than criminal enterprise, the main 
concerns before the courts related to property rights, shareholder disputes and 
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questions of corporate governance. the types of structures under consideration 
were joint ventures, holding companies and investment vehicles. In most cases, 
these were ordinary commercial disputes concerning normal business activities and 
standard types of investment structures that one would expect to see in a normal 
and mature legal environment.
the rest of this paper will therefore dispense with the bias and unreliability 
of common narratives about offshore jurisdictions and instead show how a legal 
analysis is essential to understanding the role that offshore structures have played, 
by looking at aspects of the russian legal system that gave rise to the demand for 
offshore vehicles and aspects of offshore jurisdictions that made them suitable for 
use by russian investors. the Paper will explore how the need for legal certainty 
has been a key driver of the use of offshore jurisdictions, which has been an issue 
of key importance given historical deficiencies and uncertainties in russia’s legal 
and financial infrastructure.
3. The Historical and Legal Context to Property Rights  
in Russia
In order to understand the circumstances which gave rise to the need to use 
offshore platforms to structure financial transactions, it is essential to look at the 
legal context to russian property rights. By looking at the russian legal system, it will 
be possible to have a clearer idea as to what issues created the demand for offshore 
jurisdictions, and what problems were addressed by the use of offshore vehicles. In 
order to understand the russian legal system, it will be useful to consider its recent 
development.
Following the collapse of the soviet union in the early 1990s, russian society 
underwent a number of changes, which included periods of political and economic 
instability. Further changes arose in the legal sphere with the development of a 
new code of law, reflecting the change from a socialist-based economy to a free-
market oriented society. these changes had an impact on the investment climate 
as investors were concerned about uncertain legal protections, unclear property 
rights, and the threat of expropriation of their assets.
given the changes in russian society, new corporate laws were enacted to reflect 
the development of the new market based model. the changes in russian law and 
society ‘led to many quick codifications of relatively new concepts. the earliest laws 
following the collapse reflect this haste.’  the swift enactment of new legislation was 
described as having created ‘a conflicted body of corporate law that can often prove 
unpredictable for entrepreneurs and legal counsel alike, particularly where foreign 
investment is concerned.’
these changes in russian corporate law also impacted on investors attitudes 
towards FdI into russia, with karhunen and Ledyaeva observing that
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a key institution affecting FdI is the legal framework, which includes the 
legislative system as formal institution and law enforcement as informal 
institution. the unpredictability and arbitrariness of legislative changes 
combined with the lack of transparency in law enforcement is one of the 
key challenges faced by investors in russia.
Not only did the new legal framework prove unpredictable to investors, there 
was also uncertainty as to how such laws would be implemented and enforced. 
this was a legitimate concern for investors, given that russia had an inexperienced 
judiciary who were unfamiliar with the new laws and uncertain how to apply them. 
As kuzmina observed, although
such countries as the u.s. had a long history of courts regulating the issues 
of reasonableness of defensive actions in takeovers, fiduciary duties, conflict 
of interest, russian lawyers and judges had virtually no practical experience 
in corporate disputes as private business did not exist as a notion during the 
soviet era.
these concerns were also raised by the oECd, which noted that ‘[t]he main 
problems are limited experience in interpretation of the law and a lack of guidelines 
from higher judicial authorities, which could reduce incoherent decisions by lower 
courts.’ As a result, investors were uncertain as to the scope and effect of the new 
laws and as to their treatment and interpretation by the courts.
Additionally, investors were unclear whether their new rights were actually 
capable of enforcement. For instance, dzarasov noted that ‘[t]he new laws contained 
some clauses which in theory protect the rights of minority shareholders’ such as 
the rights to take part in meetings, access to information, demand repurchase of 
shares and initiate civil action against the company, but
[i]n the early 1990s, many of these rights in russia were purely theoretical, 
because it was impossible to enforce them through the court or by other legal 
means . . . [for] in russia, the most pressing problem is not quality of legislation 
but its practical enforcement. when abused by insiders, shareholders are 
usually passive and do not try to secure their rights in court . . . For most 
judicial disputes, the party with greater administrative and financial resources 
appears to be favoured.
given the general unavailability of formal legal enforcement, russian investors 
often had to rely on informal and extra-judicial enforcement mechanisms when 
doing business in russia. For instance, dzarasov suggested that due to the lack of 
regulatory enforcement, it was common to have business networks based on family 
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and clan relationships where ‘[e]nforcement of contracts were secured by the mutual 
trust of family relatives . . . [or] by coercion on the part of clans.’ however, this was 
clearly an imperfect means of enforcement and remained the privilege of certain 
social groups, given that this form of enforcement relied on contact networks and 
informal relationships rather than standardised and universal codes.
As a result, investing in russia was not without risk, given the uncertainty of the 
new laws and the problems of enforcing them. Investors therefore sought legal 
certainty and the solution could be found offshore. As some observers noted:
In the case of emerging economies, such components of poor institutional 
environment as corruption, regulatory uncertainty, underdeveloped 
intellectual property rights protection and governmental interference are 
commonplace. [overseas foreign direct investment] to a location with more 
supportive institutions would provide means to escape those institutional 
constraints.
offshore jurisdictions, such as the BVI, could provide these more supportive 
institutions and were therefore chosen as a platform to mitigate the risks inherent 
in the russian legal system. taking the BVI as an example, there were a number of 
attributes that made it a suitable venue in which to relocate russian enterprise. For 
instance, the BVI is a British overseas territory, being a self governing dependency of 
the united kingdom, and therefore politically stable. It is a common law jurisdiction, 
based on English law, whose ultimate court of appeal is to the Privy Council in 
London. the jurisdiction is noted for the quality of its commercial law and the territory 
has a dedicated commercial court. Additionally, it offered a zero tax, regulatory light 
platform with flexible corporate legislation.
the importance of this legal flexibility for russian investors can be seen in three 
key ways. Firstly, the BVI could offer a neutral third party jurisdiction with a mature 
and predictable body of law, thereby ensuring legal certainty in terms of rights and 
the enforcement of such rights. secondly, the absence of cumbersome regulation 
in the BVI ensured that corporate vehicles could be operated with the maximum of 
flexibility. As a result, the BVI offered a commercial environment which was more 
permissive than in other jurisdictions, it being observed that the advantages of 
the BVI was that it generally follows ‘the uk legal system for corporate law but [is] 
not under the FsA or Eu regulations.’  thirdly, the availability of common law rights 
and remedies provided numerous benefits to russian investors, as this would (as 
will be examined further in the following section) allow russian enterprise to rely 
on western principles of corporate governance and to structure joint ventures and 
co-investment in ways that would not be possible under russian civil law.
As a result, it was for legal reasons, rather than questions of round-tripping or criminal 
intent, that led to the use of offshore jurisdictions to structure russian investment. 
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As kuzmina notes, ‘investors, not satisfied with the rules of russian corporate law, 
started searching for a new market for law which eventually resulted in jurisdictional 
competition between russia and, not surprisingly, offshore zones.’ the next section 
will consider, in more detail, some of the specific deficiencies in russian law that 
encouraged the move offshore, and the various ways in which offshore jurisdictions 
would provide solutions to such deficiencies in the russian legal system.
4. The Legal Rationale for Moving Offshore
As previously discussed, most offshore jurisdictions, are politically stable 
jurisdictions with established legal systems based on English common law. the BVI 
is the pre-eminent jurisdiction for the establishment of offshore companies, with 
over 482,000 active companies as of the first quarter of 2014, and is well regarded 
for its modern commercial law, which is based to a large extent on the delaware 
Commercial Code. one of the key attributes of the BVI is the quality of its legal 
infrastructure, as the jurisdiction has a modern commercial court with particular 
expertise in shareholder disputes, which was noted by The Economist recently, where 
it was observed that the ‘[c]ourts in the British Virgin Islands hear a good share of all 
disputes involving international joint ventures.’
given the many advantages of jurisdictions such as the BVI, it was a natural 
choice for russian investors who sought a legally secure environment from which 
to conduct business, in distinction with the legal uncertainties inherent in russia. 
In addition, an offshore jurisdiction, such as the BVI, would be chosen over other 
more mature jurisdictions because, aside from legal certainty, it could offer cost 
efficiencies and greater corporate flexibility than would be available in onshore 
legal environments.
offshore jurisdictions were chosen by russian investors in order to overcome a 
variety of legal and commercial uncertainties, but chief among these were the need 
to protect assets, access capital, and rely on common law principles of corporate 
governance and property rights. these specific concerns will be examined in more 
detail in the rest of this section.
4.1. Asset Protection
offshore jurisdictions are often used to protect assets against the risk of seizure, 
whether from other business partners or from the government by locating ownership 
in a neutral and legally robust jurisdiction. they are also used to protect family assets 
from dissipation, such as in private wealth structures which provide succession 
planning solutions. Assets can be protected by using offshore jurisdictions in a 
number of ways, whether by locating a business enterprise outside of russia, to avoid 
expropriation by the state, by establishing a joint venture in a neutral jurisdiction, 
to reduce the risk of misappropriation by business partners through utilising the 
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protections offered by a mature legal environment, or by establishing the private 
wealth structure offshore, to take advantage of the trusts laws available in common 
law jurisdictions. the rest of this section 4.1 will consider why offshore jurisdictions 
were chosen to protect against political risk or to ensure the integrity of family wealth, 
whereas the question of joint ventures will be explored further in sec. 4.3 below.
the question of political risk has always been a key concern for russian investors. 
Following the collapse of the soviet union, there was uncertainty whether the new 
free market model would continue and whether private property rights would 
continue to be protected, and in the first decade of this century, there were fears 
over possible expropriation by the state following a number of high profile cases 
by the government against russian businessmen. these factors, together with the 
continued uncertainty in the legal system, led one academic to conclude that ‘the 
main factor of the capital flight from russia is “chronic multidimensional crisis of 
society, economy and state”.’
As a result of such political uncertainties, russian investors turned to offshore 
jurisdictions in order to protect assets against political and legal risks by locating 
them offshore and ensuring that any dispute concerning ownership would have to 
occur offshore, under the protection of a neutral and mature legal system. By locating 
an enterprise offshore, the investor would gain the ‘ability to “manage institutional 
idiosyncrasies” including the ability to protect against the “grabbing hand” of 
government and opportunistic behaviour of local business partners.’ therefore, by 
incorporating an enterprise in a jurisdiction like the BVI, a russian investor would 
be able to rely on the established laws of the offshore jurisdiction to protect their 
property rights, rather than under the imperfect and undeveloped laws of russia, 
and to rely on enforcement mechanisms provided by the offshore jurisdiction, rather 
than the informal family or clan enforcement system described by dzarasov, or the 
uncertain protections offered by the russian courts.
this rationale for the use of offshore companies is not only evidenced by the 
actual use of such companies, but also confirmed by the opinions of the russian 
investors who utilised such structures. For instance, a recent article by the Associated 
Press noted that ‘[l]eading businessmen have said they would be willing to drop 
[incorporating offshore] only after russia launches tangible reforms of the court 
system and law enforcement.’ Furthermore, one study noted that ‘[i]nterviews with 
many russian entrepreneurs confirm the fact that at least partly capital outflows 
in 90s was a trial to escape country risks, the indicator of rational behaviour of 
new owners.’ As a result, the use of offshore jurisdictions was a rational response 
to inefficiencies in the russian political and economic system, and not simply, as 
some commentators would suggest, a case of round-tripping or the use of such 
structures for illicit purposes.
Aside from protecting against political and jurisdictional risk, offshore jurisdictions 
have also been used to protect and maintain assets in private wealth planning 
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structures. this form of asset protection has become increasingly important as 
the generation that built their fortunes following the collapse of the former soviet 
union now needs to consider how to maintain and protect that wealth. offshore 
jurisdictions provide such solutions given that they allow for the establishment of 
trusts and foundations, which are commonly used in the west as structures for the 
preservation of wealth. In contrast, russian law does not recognise the common 
law concept of the trust, which explains why offshore jurisdictions were frequently 
chosen to establish such structures. trust structures involve a transfer of ownership 
in assets from a settlor to a trustee, who then holds the assets for the benefit of 
certain beneficiaries. the advantage of this approach is that they allow the settlor to 
transfer legal title to assets while allowing some control over the use of such assets 
and making provision for the future use and enjoyment of such assets. there are 
various reasons behind the use of trusts and foundations, although these frequently 
include the preservation of family wealth for future generations, to guard against 
the fragmentation of family business, to guard against the possibility of divorce, to 
allow for philanthropy, or to address concerns in relation to political instability and 
personal safety.
4.2. Access to Capital
Aside from being used to preserve assets, offshore jurisdictions are also used 
as a platform to access international capital. For instance, The Economist noted that 
investors are drawn to the BVI in particular, as they are ‘attracted by the ease of raising 
funds, cheaper access to capital markets, speed of set-up and access to reliable 
courts.’ Aside from these general advantages, russian investors also sought to use 
overseas jurisdictions as a platform for capital raising, given that russia had a number 
of structural issues which made raising finance difficult and often led to capital flight. 
karhunen and Ledyaeva identified a number of these issues, noting that in russia 
‘[t]he root causes of capital flight consist of an unsettled political environment, 
macroeconomic instability, a confiscatory tax system, an insolvent banking system, 
and weak protection of property rights.’
In contrast with the perceived problems with the russian legal, financial 
and political landscape, offshore jurisdictions were seen as a stable and mature 
environment with which to access international finance. For example, in reviewing 
the rationale for using offshore jurisdictions in international trade, gordon and 
Morriss noted:
[E]xpanding trade increases the need for access to deep capital markets 
and, crucially, to legal systems capable of handling complex business 
organization and contractual matters . . . to accommodate such needs, a legal 
system needs both a group of sophisticated decision makers and regulators 
capable of adding value without imposing excessive costs and a body of law 
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that allows transaction engineering to structure transactions to predictably 
accomplish clients’ goals. Financial transactions may thus be structured to 
take advantage of such jurisdictions by legally locating crucial steps (e.g., 
issuing bonds) in them.
given the low costs, legal stability and international recognition of offshore 
jurisdictions such as the BVI, there was a clear legal and commercial rationale for 
russian entrepreneurs to locate their business in such jurisdictions. Indeed, even 
some of the more critical studies on the use of offshore jurisdictions in russia admit 
that ‘firms establish subsidiaries in such locations in order to enjoy more favourable 
institutional environment such as better functioning financial markets.’
As a result, russian businesses began to use offshore jurisdictions to structure their 
operations and raise finance. As koroliuk and rudenko observed, ‘very often such 
jurisdiction is used as staging bases for investment in third countries. For example, 
leading foreign assets holder, russian oil and gas multinational “LukoIL” exercises 
all its international projects for exploration and extraction of raw material through 
Limited Liability Company “LukoIL overseas holding” registered in the British Virgin 
Islands.’ In fact, a number of leading russian enterprises have located their business 
in the BVI, including TNK-BP (which was a joint venture between Rosneft and BP) and 
MTS (russia’s leading mobile operator). Additionally, the russian supermarket group 
Lenta is incorporated in the BVI and recently held an initial public offering on the 
London stock Exchange, with a market capitalisation of $4.3 billion at March 2014. It 
is therefore clear that offshore jurisdictions were integral to the financing strategies 
of international business structures and that the russian enterprises using such 
jurisdictions included russia’s most prestigious and dynamic companies.
this desire to use offshore jurisdictions as a platform for raising international 
finance can also be seen in practice, with a good source of information contained 
within the court judgments of the Eastern Caribbean supreme Court. For example, 
one BVI court judgment provided insight into the rationale behind choosing to 
incorporate a company in the BVI, describing how a witness
explained under cross-examination that when the volumes of [the russian 
company’s] coffee production started to grow, it became necessary to do 
business with western companies and finance these larger volumes. After 
the 1998 crisis the western companies refused to give credit to russia. this 
was the reason why she decided to incorporate [the BVI company] she said, 
with the idea that this Company would assist in [the russian company’s] 
trading and importation of coffee from different parts of the world. [the BVI 
company] would act as intermediary between [the russian company] and its 
coffee suppliers from outside of russia. this would reduce costs and permit 
the respondents to better structure their coffee business operations.
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Again, we see a need to incorporate in an offshore jurisdiction such as the BVI in 
order to escape the financial constraints within russia (in this case occasioned by the 
1998 financial crisis). Again, the rationale for doing so is to reduce costs, obtain access 
to international finance and to ensure the efficient structuring of the enterprise.
the russian approach fits international patterns of investment through offshore 
jurisdictions, as sutherland, Voss and Buckley noted a similar phenomenon in respect 
of the Chinese experience, observing that Chinese enterprises moved offshore in 
order ‘to exploit offshore capital markets and superior institutional environments’ 
because it is ‘offshore jurisdictions alone that allow them to access capital markets 
and institutions unavailable to them.’ we see this approach extend to russia, with 
observers of the russian experience noting that, by incorporating offshore, a russian 
business could gain advantages over purely russian enterprises as ‘their access to 
resources such as foreign banking and financial expertise and managerial know how 
through the offshore investment puts them in a superior position towards purely 
domestic firms.’
4.3. Property Rights
offshore jurisdictions have also been used by russian investors to take advantage 
of the property rights available in offshore jurisdictions, in order to overcome specific 
deficiencies in russian law. one area in which this can be seen is with joint ventures 
and shareholder agreements.
Joint ventures are frequently located in offshore jurisdictions as a means of 
protecting the joint venture from legal and financial risks. one way of achieving 
this is to ensure that the ‘valuable assets of the joint venture might be owned by a 
legal entity that was bankruptcy-remote from either of the joint venturers.’ A second 
way of protecting against legal risk ‘is to choose the law and legal institutions of a 
jurisdiction other than the home jurisdictions of the contracting parties (to avoid 
potential bias).’ A third way of protecting against risk is to incorporate a BVI joint 
venture vehicle above the russian operating company in order to ensure that any 
sale can occur at the offshore level, thereby avoiding the financial and legal risks 
involved in a sale at the local level, given that ‘the transfer of assets in russia can be 
very difficult, mired in red-tap and bureaucracy and time consuming.’ In each of these 
cases, offshore jurisdictions offered simple structural solutions to protect a joint 
venture against financial and jurisdictional risk. however, joint ventures and other 
forms of co-investment have also been structured offshore in order to negotiate 
specific problems arising under russian law. these specific issues are commonly 
seen in relation to shareholder agreements.
In establishing joint-ventures or other forms of co-investment, shareholder 
agreements are an important and commonly used tool. shareholder agreements 
commonly provide for a number of negotiated rights given to investors in a joint 
venture, which can include preferential rights as to voting, distributions or liquidation, 
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tailored corporate governance provisions, pre-emption rights on any further issue of 
shares, rights of first refusal on the sale of shares, dispute resolution mechanisms and 
governing law provisions. the advantages of such provisions are that they allow for 
differing economic and voting rights to be provided to different investors and provide 
mechanisms which assist with the effective corporate governance of a business.
however, shareholder agreements were not legally recognised in russia by 
the government and the courts, save to the extent that such agreements were 
consistent with codified law. the problem arose that, up until 2009, russian law did 
not recognise contractual provisions relating to share transfers, restrictions on the 
sale of shares, and tailored corporate governance provisions relating to voting and 
board appointments. this had the effect that shareholder agreements were void to 
the extent that they provided for such matters. this problem became pronounced 
in 2006, when a number of court rulings confirmed that shareholder agreements 
would be void where they ran counter to provisions of the russian Civil Code and the 
Joint stock Company Law, for example by including pre-emption rights and none-
competition clauses. As a result, it was not possible to structure investment in russia 
using standard common law shareholder protections, and this had an impact on the 
willingness of international investors to invest in russia. It also made it difficult for 
russian investors to rely on the sophisticated legal protections that were commonly 
available in common law jurisdictions.
given that ‘[c]ontractual restrictions on transferring shares, “tag-along” and “drag-
along” mechanisms, contractual regulation of voting procedures and board formation, 
and call options and put options were all considered illegal . . . institutional investors 
traditionally used offshore legal entities’ where such provisions were recognised by 
the law and commonly used. As a result, it was common practice to incorporate the 
investment vehicle in an offshore jurisdiction, where shareholder agreements would 
be recognised and enforced, where the provisions of the shareholder agreement 
could be incorporated within the constitutional documents of the offshore vehicle, 
where shareholder remedies were available, and where the parties could rely upon 
the legal certainty provided by a neutral and mature common law jurisdiction.
the russian government was, of course, aware of these deficiencies in russian 
law and, in 2009, steps were taken to address this issue. An amendment to the Law 
on Joint stock Companies was introduced which formally recognized the legality of 
shareholder agreements. however, the amendments were widely considered to be 
problematic as they ‘failed to clarify whether choice-of-law-provisions that allowed 
for the application of another country’s law were now available in shareholders’ 
agreements.’ Another issue was the perceived inflexibility of the 2009 amendments, 
which led one observer to comment:
russian courts generally interpret codified corporate law as both mandatory 
and exhaustive. given that the 2009 amendment sets out what shareholders’ 
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agreements can and cannot include, much of the flexibility inherent to the 
instruments in other countries is lost, along with much of the value to foreign 
investors who wish to structure corporate relations in a familiar way.
As a result, and despite the 2009 amendments, there was still a need to incorporate 
a vehicle offshore and rely on shareholder agreements to structure the relationship 
between investors, where russian law was silent or deficient. For instance, shareholder 
agreements could provide for issues that were not addressed by russian law, such 
as shareholder deadlocks, and could provide for negotiated rights to appoint board 
directors. whereas under russian law the right to appoint directors was based on 
the level of ownership, rather than any negotiated individual rights. Additionally, 
many shareholders faced an inability to assert their rights under russian corporate 
law as ‘[i]n many cases, foreign or minority investors were conspicuously excluded 
from voting arrangements, excluded from decisions regarding share dilution that 
disproportionately affected them, or saw their investments radically decline in value 
when the courts refused to protect invested assets.’
however, russian law is not static and a number of further changes were made 
to the russian Civil Code in the years since 2009, with the most recent amendments 
coming into force on November 1, 2013. the 2013 amendments attempted to 
resolve the foreign law issue by providing that as long as one party to a shareholders 
agreement is a foreign person, the agreement may be subject to foreign law. 
however, some observers have noted that issues still remain in using shareholder 
agreements in respect of a russian enterprise. one paper noted that issues may 
continue to arise due to the fact that the agreement may not override mandatory 
rules (which are wider in russia as opposed to common law jurisdictions), that a 
company cannot be party to a shareholder agreement under russian law, and that 
the law does not extend to purely russian co-investments, in light of which the 
authors ‘do not see an immediate change to the tendency to structure russian joint 
investments offshore.’
As a result, and despite the changing russian legal landscape, there continue to 
be issues in using shareholder agreements under russian law, particularly given the 
rigidity of corporate law in russia which has frequently led to the view that with ‘the 
lack of incentives to attempt structuring a shareholders’ agreement under russian 
law, and the benefits available to those who establish an offshore holding company, 
[the incorporation of an offshore vehicle] is the most prudent’ approach.
5. Conclusion
the preceding analysis illustrates that when consideration is given to the legal and 
economic context in which the need for offshore companies has arisen, the reasons 
for their popularity become clear. when close attention is paid to the function and 
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employment of offshore companies in practice, the rationale for their use becomes 
apparent. In each case, it is clear that the legal rationale has been a dominant 
motivating factor for the use of offshore jurisdictions by russian investors.
It can therefore be seen that, contrary to the popular myths that offshore 
jurisdictions are used for the purposes of round-tripping or laundering the proceeds 
of corruption, they are actually used in practice to negotiate inefficiencies in the 
russian legal system. In cases where offshore companies have been used, they have 
been employed in order to provide practical solutions to technical legal issues. this 
usage is confirmed by practice, by theory and by context. this usage is also supported 
by a close reading of the court judgments relating to the use of such vehicles.
what the incidences of such usage tell us is that offshore companies are used 
as an efficient means of managing legal risk. offshore jurisdictions have enabled 
investors to manage risk by allowing russian investors to protect their assets from 
governments or unscrupulous business partners, to obtain access to finance in an 
uncertain economic environment, and to rely upon certain and well defined property 
rights and legal protections when co-investing with others. offshore centres are 
used because it is economically efficient and commercially practical to make use of 
such jurisdictions, given that the use of common law standards enable investors to 
structure deals to allow for efficient profit sharing and risk mitigation.
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